Most cited documents in this series:

Year	Title	Cited
2006	Donor influence in multilateral development banks: The case of the Asian Development Bank RePEc:spr:revint:v:1:y:2006:i:2:p:173-195 [Citation Analysis]	31
2006	IMF program compliance: Aggregate index versus policy specific research strategies RePEc:spr:revint:v:1:y:2006:i:4:p:359-378 [Citation Analysis]	30
2006	Optimal transfers and participation decisions in international environmental agreements RePEc:spr:revint:v:1:y:2006:i:4:p:379-396 [Citation Analysis]	28
2008	The International Monetary Fund: A review of the recent evidence RePEc:spr:revint:v:3:y:2008:i:2:p:123-149 [Citation Analysis]	22
2006	Principal-agent problems in international organizations RePEc:spr:revint:v:1:y:2006:i:2:p:125-138 [Citation Analysis]	19
2009	Does government ideology influence political alignment with the U.S.? An empirical analysis of voting in the UN General Assembly RePEc:spr:revint:v:4:y:2009:i:3:p:245-268 [Citation Analysis]	19
2008	IMF conditionality: An approach based on the theory of special interest politics RePEc:spr:revint:v:3:y:2008:i:2:p:105-121 [Citation Analysis]	14
2006	Optimal central bank design: Benchmarks for the ECB RePEc:spr:revint:v:1:y:2006:i:3:p:207-235 [Citation Analysis]	12
2006	Evaluating the impact of IMF programs: A comparison of matching and instrumental-variable estimators RePEc:spr:revint:v:1:y:2006:i:2:p:99-124 [Citation Analysis]	12
2006	Regional public goods and international organizations RePEc:spr:revint:v:1:y:2006:i:1:p:5-25 [Citation Analysis]	9
2011	Informal influence in the Asian Development Bank RePEc:spr:revint:v:6:y:2011:i:3:p:223-257 [Citation Analysis]	8
2008	Congressional voting on funding the international financial institutions RePEc:spr:revint:v:3:y:2008:i:4:p:351-374 [Citation Analysis]	7
2011	When BITs have some bite: The political-economic environment for bilateral investment treaties RePEc:spr:revint:v:6:y:2011:i:1:p:1-32 [Citation Analysis]	7
2011	Explaining IMF lending decisions after the Cold War RePEc:spr:revint:v:6:y:2011:i:3:p:307-340 [Citation Analysis]	6
2006	IMF quotas: Constructing an international organization using inferior building blocks RePEc:spr:revint:v:1:y:2006:i:2:p:153-171 [Citation Analysis]	6
2006	Reviving the Bank and Fund RePEc:spr:revint:v:1:y:2006:i:1:p:49-59 [Citation Analysis]	6
2008	Trust in international organizations: An empirical investigation focusing on the United Nations RePEc:spr:revint:v:3:y:2008:i:1:p:65-93 [Citation Analysis]	5
2008	The political economy of labor market regulation by the European Union RePEc:spr:revint:v:3:y:2008:i:4:p:435-465 [Citation Analysis]	5
2010	The effects of IMF programs on U.S. foreign direct investment in the developing world RePEc:spr:revint:v:5:y:2010:i:1:p:73-95 [Citation Analysis]	5
2011	The cost of complying with human rights treaties: The convention on the rights of the child and basic immunization RePEc:spr:revint:v:6:y:2011:i:1:p:33-56 [Citation Analysis]	5
2010	The politics of IO performance: A framework RePEc:spr:revint:v:5:y:2010:i:3:p:227-248 [Citation Analysis]	4
2006	Strengthening the citizens role in international organizations RePEc:spr:revint:v:1:y:2006:i:1:p:27-43 [Citation Analysis]	4
2010	The politics of performance evaluation: Independent evaluation at the International Monetary Fund RePEc:spr:revint:v:5:y:2010:i:3:p:365-385 [Citation Analysis]	4
2011	Is two better than one? The effects of IMF and World Bank interaction on growth RePEc:spr:revint:v:6:y:2011:i:3:p:287-306 [Citation Analysis]	4
2007	How the court made a federation of the EU RePEc:spr:revint:v:2:y:2007:i:1:p:59-75 [Citation Analysis]	4
2010	Jean Pisani-Ferry and Adam S. Posen. 2009. The Euro at Ten: The next global currency? (Washington D.C.: Peterson Institute for International Economics, Bruegel) RePEc:spr:revint:v:5:y:2010:i:1:p:101-105 [Citation Analysis]	4
2006	Reply to Gordon Tullock RePEc:spr:revint:v:1:y:2006:i:1:p:47-48 [Citation Analysis]	4
2010	The political economy of exchange rate regimes in transition economies RePEc:spr:revint:v:5:y:2010:i:1:p:1-25 [Citation Analysis]	4
2009	Public support for the international economic organizations: Evidence from developing countries RePEc:spr:revint:v:4:y:2009:i:2:p:185-209 [Citation Analysis]	3
2009	Controlling coalitions: Social lending at the multilateral development banks RePEc:spr:revint:v:4:y:2009:i:4:p:407-433 [Citation Analysis]	3
2008	The implementation of IMF programs: A conceptual framework RePEc:spr:revint:v:3:y:2008:i:1:p:41-64 [Citation Analysis]	3
2008	The effect of ECB communication on interest rates: An assessment RePEc:spr:revint:v:3:y:2008:i:4:p:375-398 [Citation Analysis]	3
2006	Michael Doyle and Nicholas Sambanis, Making war and building peace: United Nations peace operations RePEc:spr:revint:v:1:y:2006:i:4:p:401-403 [Citation Analysis]	3
2010	The World Trade Organization at work: Performance in a member-driven milieu RePEc:spr:revint:v:5:y:2010:i:3:p:345-363 [Citation Analysis]	3
2010	International regulation without international government: Improving IO performance through orchestration RePEc:spr:revint:v:5:y:2010:i:3:p:315-344 [Citation Analysis]	3
2008	Outside and inside competition for international organizations—from analysis to innovations RePEc:spr:revint:v:3:y:2008:i:4:p:335-350 [Citation Analysis]	3
2010	Performance under ambiguity: International organization performance in UN peacekeeping RePEc:spr:revint:v:5:y:2010:i:3:p:249-284 [Citation Analysis]	3
2007	Daniel W. Drezner: All politics is global: Explaining international regulatory regimes RePEc:spr:revint:v:2:y:2007:i:3:p:301-303 [Citation Analysis]	3
2006	Do donors cooperatively fund foreign aid? RePEc:spr:revint:v:1:y:2006:i:4:p:337-357 [Citation Analysis]	2
2007	Should it be curtains for some of the IMF’s lending windows? RePEc:spr:revint:v:2:y:2007:i:3:p:281-299 [Citation Analysis]	2
2006	A response to Allan Meltzer RePEc:spr:revint:v:1:y:2006:i:1:p:61-64 [Citation Analysis]	2
2008	IMF retrospective and prospective: A public goods viewpoint RePEc:spr:revint:v:3:y:2008:i:3:p:221-238 [Citation Analysis]	2
2007	Are economic forecasts of the International Monetary Fund politically biased? A public choice analysis RePEc:spr:revint:v:2:y:2007:i:3:p:239-260 [Citation Analysis]	2
2008	Networks of regulatory agencies as regional public goods: Improving infrastructure performance RePEc:spr:revint:v:3:y:2008:i:2:p:179-200 [Citation Analysis]	2
2006	BRICSAM and the non–WTO RePEc:spr:revint:v:1:y:2006:i:3:p:237-261 [Citation Analysis]	2
2009	IMF programs and human rights, 1981–2003 RePEc:spr:revint:v:4:y:2009:i:1:p:47-72 [Citation Analysis]	2
2007	Domestic structures and constitution-building in an international organization: Introduction RePEc:spr:revint:v:2:y:2007:i:2:p:105-113 [Citation Analysis]	2
2009	Renewing IMF surveillance: Transparency, accountability, and independence RePEc:spr:revint:v:4:y:2009:i:1:p:29-46 [Citation Analysis]	2
2007	Referendums in the EU’s constitution building process RePEc:spr:revint:v:2:y:2007:i:2:p:177-218 [Citation Analysis]	2
2009	Financing the peace: Evaluating World Bank post-conflict assistance programs RePEc:spr:revint:v:4:y:2009:i:1:p:1-27 [Citation Analysis]	2

Citing documents used to compute impact factor 16:

Year	Title	See
2011	Crisis in the Euro area: coopetitive game solutions as new policy tools RePEc:pra:mprapa:31891	[Citation Analysis]
2011	A new governance for the EMU and the economic policy framework RePEc:pra:mprapa:30237	[Citation Analysis]
2011	International institutions and credible commitment of non-democracies RePEc:spr:revint:v:6:y:2011:i:2:p:141-162	[Citation Analysis]
2011	How soon is now? The effects of the IMF on economic reforms in Latin America RePEc:spr:revint:v:6:y:2011:i:2:p:189-213	[Citation Analysis]
2011	Explaining IMF lending decisions after the Cold War RePEc:spr:revint:v:6:y:2011:i:3:p:307-340	[Citation Analysis]
2011	Foreign aid and global governance: Buying Bretton Woods – the Swiss-bloc case RePEc:spr:revint:v:6:y:2011:i:3:p:369-391	[Citation Analysis]
2011	Guilt by association: The link between states’ influence and the legitimacy of intergovernmental organizations RePEc:spr:revint:v:6:y:2011:i:1:p:57-84	[Citation Analysis]
2011	What determines trust in international organizations? An empirical analysis for the IMF, the World Bank, and the WTO RePEc:pra:mprapa:34550	[Citation Analysis]
2011	What Determines Trust in International Organizations? RePEc:knz:dpteco:1144	[Citation Analysis]
2011	Do human rights offenders oppose human rights resolutions in the United Nations? RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:146:y:2011:i:3:p:443-467	[Citation Analysis]
2011	Does government ideology influence budget composition? Empirical evidence from OECD countries RePEc:spr:ecogov:v:12:y:2011:i:2:p:101-134	[Citation Analysis]
2011	Does government ideology affect personal happiness? A test RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:111:y:2011:i:2:p:161-165	[Citation Analysis]
2011	More Dollars than Sense: Refining Our Knowledge of Development Finance Using AidData RePEc:eee:wdevel:v:39:y:2011:i:11:p:1891-1906	[Citation Analysis]
2011	Dodging Adverse Selection: How Donor Type and Governance Condition Aid’s Effects on School Enrollment RePEc:eee:wdevel:v:39:y:2011:i:11:p:2044-2053	[Citation Analysis]
2011	Aid for trade as a public good RePEc:taf:jitecd:v:20:y:2011:i:6:p:711-728	[Citation Analysis]
2011	Climate business for poverty reduction? The role of the World Bank RePEc:spr:revint:v:6:y:2011:i:3:p:259-286	[Citation Analysis]

Cites in year: CiY